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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AP ACHE TANK LINES, INC., 
COWBOY OIL COMPANY, 
ORVILLE R. STEVENS, 
Administrator of 0. H. Guyman 
Estate, CRYSTAL B. GUY-
MAN and PAUL W. COOK, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
BEALL PIPE AND TANK 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10724 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellants brought suit against the re-
spondent in the District Court of Carbon County, 
State of Utah for damages to their property, and 
respondent filed a ''motion to quash" service of 
summons. Subsequently, on July 27, 1966, the Hon-
orable Henry Ruggeri, Judge, granted the motion 
from which order this appeal is taken. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On December 30, 1965, appellants' filed suit 
against the respondent in the District Court of Car-
1 
hon County. Respondent appeared specifically and 
filed a motion entitled a "motion to quash" service 
of summons. Memoranda were submitted by the 
parties and on July 27, 1966, the Honorable Henry 
Ruggeri, Judge, issued an order granting the re-
spondent's "motion to quash." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's 
decision and a judgment determining that the Dis-
trict Court of Carbon County has full jurisdiction 
over the appellants' claims against defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants' submit the following statement 
of facts which are generally uncontested. 
The plaintiffs' filed an action in the District 
Court of Carbon County alleging that plaintiff, 
Apache Tank Lines, Inc., was the owner of a petro-
leum tractor-trailer which at the time of the cause 
of action was leased to Cowboy Oil Co., (R-1). The 
other plaintiff was the Estate of 0. H. Guyrnan. 
It was alleged that on November 4, 1964, the trac-
tor-trailer unit was destroyed in Price City, Carbon 
County, Utah. It was also alleged that the tractor-
trailer unit had been purchased from the respon· 
dent on April 24, 1964. It was further alleged that 
negligence and breach of various sales warrantees 
by the defendant rendered defendant liable to the 
plaintiffs in the sum of $30,387.16 plus $11,761.61 
special damages ( R-1, 2, 3) . 
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Service of the summons and complaint was 
made upon the Secretary of State of the State of 
Utah (R-9). Subsequent thereto, the respondent 
purported to appear specially and filed a motion 
to quash on the grounds that it was not doing busi-
ness in the State of Utah, and was not doing busi-
ness in the State of Utah on April 24, 1964, nor 
anytime since then ( R-10) . The motion further 
assailed the service of process on the grounds that 
it was not served upon any representative of the 
company. An affidavit from the company's comp-
troller was filed accompanying the motion which 
stated that the respondent had qualified to do busi-
ness in Utah as a foreign corporation on May 3, 
1961, but the Secretary of State had revoked the 
company's certificate of authority on February 28, 
1964, for failure to file an annual report for the 
year 1962 (R-13, 56, 57). The affidavit further 
noted that the respondent had maintained a salaried 
employee in Utah from May 3, 1961, to around 
October, 1963, but had had no employees residing 
in the State of Utah since then. It also stated the 
respondent had not had any office, licensed dealer, 
franchise agent, commission agent, bank accounts, 
or did any advertising in Utah since October, 1963 
(R-14). 
No showing was made by the respondent that 
it ever filed any withdrawal from the State. On the 
basis of the above facts the trial judge granted its 
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the order quashing the service, apparently on the 
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
RESPONDENTS' MOTION SINCE: 
A. THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE 
RESPONDENT, AND 
B. SERVICE WAS PROPERLY MADE ON THE 
SECRETARY OF STATE. 
Appellant submits the trial court had jurisdic-
tion over the respondent corporation. It is, of course, 
acknowledged that at the time of the alleged damage 
to appellants that respondent had no agent in Utah 
and was not engaging in solicitation of business. 
However, it is submitted that the respondent com-
pany was subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
Courts because it had qualified to do business in the 
State of Utah, and although its Certificate of Auth-
ority to do business as a foreign corporation had 
been revoked it was still present within the State 
of Utah until a withdrawal in accord with Utah 
law had been accomplished. 
It is assumed that the respondent's motion 
to quash was in fact a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12-B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, since 
there is no such thing as a "motion to quash" under 
the present Rules of Civil Procedure in Utah. 
It is admitted in the affidavit of the respondent 
that it had a Certificate of Authority to do business 
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in the State of Utah and was a duly qualified for-
ejgn corporation at one time. The only question is, 
does the revocation of the Certificate of Authority 
by the Secretary of State in such a fashion as to 
prevent service of process upon or jurisdiction over 
a corporation that has had its Certificate of Author-
ity revoked. 16-10-103 U.C.A., 1953, provided that 
a foreign corporation shall have the same powers 
and rights as a domestic corporation during the time 
that it is operating in the State of Utah. 
16-10-108 U.C.A., 1953, merely provides that 
upon issuance of a Certificate of Authority by the 
Secretary of State the foreign corporation shall be 
authol'ized to transact business in the State of Utah. 
16-10-109 U.C.A., 1953, requires the appointment 
of a registered agent for a foreign corporation upon 
whom service of process may be served. 
16-10-111 U.C.A., 1953, provides in part: 
Whenever a foreign corporation authorized 
to transact business in this state shall fail to 
appoint or maintain a registered agent in this 
state, or whenever any such registered agent 
cannot with reasonable diligence be found at 
the registered office, or whenever the Certi-
ficate of Authority of a foreign corporation 
shall be suspended or revoked, then the Sec-
retary of State shall be an agent of such c?r-
poration upon whom any such process, notice 
or demand may be served. 
Thus, if a foreign corporation's Certificate of 
Authority has been revoked, service of process on 
5 
the Secretary of State of the State of Utah is suffi. 
cient service to invoke jurisdiction if the other ele-
ments of jurisdiction are present. See Town of 
Hinkley v. Kettle River Railroad Co., 70 Minn. 105, 
72 N.W. 835; Section 13, Model Business Corpora-
tion Act Annotated. 
In Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Associ-
ation v. Willimn L. Pereira & Associates, 16 Utah 
2d 365, 401 P.2d 439 ( 1965), this court ruled that 
where a foreign corporation otherwise subject to the 
jurisdiction of the State of Utah had failed to ap-
point a registered agent to receive service of pro-
cess, that service could be effected upon the Secre-
tary of State of the State of Utah. 
It is, therefore, apparent that the respondents' 
motion to the extent it sought to "quash" the ser-
vice of process based upon a contention that the Sec-
retary of State of the State of Utah would not be 
a proper person upon whom to make service is not 
well taken if the jurisdictional prerequisites are 
present to otherwise confer jurisdiction on the court. 
At the time service of process was effected in the 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association case 
cited above, the respondent had moved itself from 
the jurisdiction and there was no registered pro-
cess agent in the state. Therefore, if this court has 
jurisdiction over the respondent, the service of pro-
cess being made upon the Secretary of State is ade-
quate to give jurisdiction over the respondent corp-
oration. 
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The present law relating to jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations is not one based upon a mech-
anical test of its presence. Rather, in the case of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
the United States Supreme Court said that juris-
diction could be based upon "fair play and substan-
tial justice." Ehrenzweig & Louisell, Jurisdiction In 
A Nntshell, State and Federal, Section 5, p. 26, 
1964. The present test seems to be one of "minimum 
contacts" with the state of the forum. If there are 
such minimum contacts with the state, it is imma-
terial whether the cause of action arises from busi-
ness within the state, the court of the state wherein 
the minimum contacts exist has jurisdiction. Perkins 
v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 
(1952); McGee v. International Life Insurance Com-
pany, 355 U.S. 220 ( 1957). It is submitted that the 
Utah statutes recognize that a foreign corporation 
that obtains a Certificate of Authority, even though 
that Certificate of Authority is revoked by the Sec-
retary of State, still has substantial minimum con-
tacts with the state to warrant its being sued in 
the State of Utah until the corporation actually 
withdraws. 
16-10-115 U.C.A., 1953, provides for the with-
drawal of a foreign corporation. In order for a 
foreign corporation to withdraw from the State of 
Utah, the corporation must deliver to the Secretary 
of State an application for withdrawal containing 
various information. Thereafter, withdrawal may 
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be had upon approval by the Secretary of State after 
the foreign corporation meeting various criteria. 
Thereafter, the corporation is still subject to suit on 
various transactions that might have arisen dur-
ing the time of its incorporation. On the other hand 
' 
the Secretary of State is authorized to revoke the 
Certificate of Authority of a foreign corporation if 
that corporation fails to abide by and comply with 
the laws of the State of Utah. 16-10-117 U.C.A., 
1953. Subsection (a) of that section provides a 
basis for revocation when "the corporation has fail-
ed to file its annual report within the time required 
by this act and has failed to pay any fees or pen-
alties prescribed by this act when they have 
become due and payable." The issuance of a 
Certificate of Revocation by the Secretary of 
State results in the suspension of the authority of 
the corporation to transact business in the state. 
16-10-118 U.C.A., 1953. To say that revocation com-
pletely ousted the corporation from the State of 
Utah and reduced all minimal contacts so that state 
courts could have no jurisdiction would give a for-
eign corporation a benefit that it otherwise would 
not receive if it went through the normal withdrawal 
process. It is submitted that revocation does nothing 
more than prevent the foreign corporation from do-
ing business in the State of Utah but that the corp-
oration is still present within the state so far as the 
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jurisdiction of citizens within the state to process 
claims against the foreign corporation. 
This conclusion is supported by the provisions 
of 16-10-111 U.C.A., 1953, which provides that when 
a foreign corporation has had its Certificate of 
Authority revoked that service of process may be 
made upon the Secretary of State. Thus the Legis-
lature has apparently recognized that the corpora-
tion still exists for the purpose of being subjected 
to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. Supporting 
his conclusion is the decision of Priidential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association v. Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P.2d 899 
( 1958) . In that case, the issue before this court was 
whether a foreign corporation which has qualified 
to do business in the State of Utah but has had its 
charter forfeited because of failure to pay taxes 
could maintain a cause of action in the State of 
Utah. The applicable statutory provision was one 
comparable to 16-10-117 U.C.A., 1953, and was 
Section 16-9-3 U.C.A., 1953, under the previous 
Corporation Act. Speaking on the applicable pro-
vision, the Court stated: 
It has no application where the foreign corp-
oration has in fact qualified to do business in 
the state (as Felt did here) and the corporate 
charter has been subjected to forfeiture for 
failure to pay taxes. 
It is submitted that by analogy, the same rule 
should be applicable to the provisions relating to 
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the revocation of a Certificate of Authority for 
failure to file an annual report. A foreign corpor-
ation desiring to avoid the jurisdiction of the State 
of Utah without going through the withdrawal 
proceedings could very simply fail to file its annual 
report and then contend that state courts had no 
jurisdiction over it simply because its business acti-
vities had ceased in the state. It is submitted that 
orderly public administration of foreign corpora-
tions requires that they remain subject to the juris-
diction of the courts of the State of Utah until they 
have properly withdrawn in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah. This being so, the mere 
revocation of the Certificate of Authority does not 
result in a complete ouster of the corporation from 
the state and there is still sufficient minimal con-
tacts sufficient to allow the corporation to be sued 
in the State of Utah by citizens, or others in the 
State of Utah, who have claims against the foreign 
corporation. Especially should this be so where the 
claim arises in the State of Utah as is the instant 
case. Limitation on the revocation of a Certificate 
of Authority should be a limitation against the corp-
oration doing business during the time that it fails 
to comply with the laws of the State of Utah and 
not a prohibition against a citizen suing the corpor-
ation. To construe the law to the contrary would in 
effect grant a foreign corporation a cloak of im· 
munity which it would not otherwise have. 
Support for this contention is noted in 25 
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Corporation Journal, Rights After Withdrawal, 3 
p. 6 ( 1966), where it is noted: 
When the loss of the corporation's right to 
do business is due to revocation rather than 
withdrawal, there is even less doubt as to the 
corporation's amenability to suit . To allow 
a corporation, by its wilful acts, to forfeit 
the right to do business in a state and thereby 
evade the jurisdiction of its courts would 
clearly be inequitable. 
A similar realization is the basis of the decision 
in Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association 
v. William L. Pereira & Associates, supra. 
The Certificate of Authority of the respondent 
was never withdrawn, as distinct from revoked. 
The question of authority to continue to transact 
business by a foreign corporation is an entirely dif-
ferent principle than the question of whether a 
company that has not withdrawn is still within the 
state for the purposes of jurisdiction. 16-10-111, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, obviously was intended 
to maintain the local jurisdiction until the criteria 
of withdrawal are met. 
A recent Arizona case, Robinson Brick & Tile 
Co. v. Copperstate Supply Co., Inc., 100 Ariz. 28, 
410 P.2d 96 (1966), is definitely in point. Plaintiff 
was a Colorado corporation. It made application 
for withdrawal from Arizona which application was 
not aproved for several months during which time 
plaintiff contracted with defendant. The trial court 
ruled plaintiff could not maintain the action be-
ll 
cause the contract was made subsequent to filing 
for withdrawal. On appeal the defendants alleged 
that plaintiff automatically revoked its license to do 
business upon filing and hence was not doing busi-
ness in Arizona and could not sue on the contract. 
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the contention 
holding the company was still present until with-
drawal was completed. 
The same ruling should be applicable here. The 
respondent was still present in Utah, only its auth-
ority to do business was revoked. Withdrawal re-
quires compliance with several other requirements, 
16-1-115, 116, U.C.A., 1953. Orderly administra-
tion requires the presence of the corporation until 
the requirements of withdrawal are met. If they are 
not met, including the tax responsibility, as was the 
case here, the corporation should be deemed present 
and service allowed under 16-10-111, U.C.A., 1953. 
It is submitted, therefore, the trial court's decision 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent failed to follow proper proce· 
dure to withdraw from doing business in Utah. Re· 
vocation of its authority was not withdrawal. It 
did not terminate the corporate presence and "mini-
mum contacts" but merely the right to operate. 
Sound public policy warrants requiring a corpor· 
ation to be deemed present until the essential re· 
quirements of withdrawal are met. Since this was 
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not done in this case, respondent was and is still 
present in Utah and subject to jurisdiction and 
service upon the Secretary of State. This court 
should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
REX J. HANSON 
Attornys for Appellants 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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